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Nature credits: income and costs, side by side
This page sets out the income and costs of nature credits (biodiversity credits, blue carbon credits and forest carbon credits), and who pays and who receives, using figures from official documents and peer-reviewed studies. Recorded sales of voluntary biodiversity credits worldwide total $6.93 million since the first sale (bloomlabs, August 2026). A study of 61 projects and 471 transactions under Japan's J-Blue Credit scheme (Kuwae et al., June 2026) reports an average unit value of about $400 per tonne, and states in its discussion that "the income from credits is often insufficient to cover the costs of implementation and certification."
This page is part of the Karatsu Data Bank, compiled by Karatsu Farm & Food, a nonprofit in Japan. It adds no conclusions or evaluations and lists only figures and statements found in the sources. Values we calculated are marked "our calculation". Figures whose only source is news reporting are marked "according to news reports" and listed separately in the source ledger.
| Term or yardstick | Meaning on this page |
|---|---|
| Nature credits | Used here for biodiversity credits, blue carbon credits (carbon in coastal and marine ecosystems such as mangroves and seaweed beds) and forest carbon credits together. |
| Biodiversity credit | A certificate representing a measured and evidence-based unit of positive biodiversity outcome that is durable and additional (Biodiversity Credit Alliance definition). |
| Break-even price | The price per tonne at which credit income exactly covers survey, conservation, certification and administration costs. |
| Upper bound of income per project | Our calculation: credit volume per project multiplied by unit price, before unsold credits, fees and costs. Actual income cannot exceed it. |
| Stacking | Issuing separate carbon and biodiversity credits from the same area or activity. |
| Ecological outcome vs credit balance | Two different indicators. Recovery of seaweed bed area or species is an outcome; the gap between credit income and cost is the balance. One being good does not mean the other is. This page lists balance figures. |
Terms and yardsticks used on this page
The same yardstick is applied to every case: the upper bound of income (credit volume per project times unit price) against the costs of surveys, conservation, certification and intermediaries. The yardstick does not change with awards or reputation. Whether a seaweed bed or forest recovered (outcome) and whether credit income exceeds cost (balance) are different indicators; this page lists the balance side.
| Indicator | Figure | As of | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Recorded sales of biodiversity credits (cumulative) | $6.93 million | Aug 2026 | bloomlabs |
| Same, estimate including over-the-counter sales | around $8-10 million | May 2026 | bloomlabs |
| Same, annual sales | 2024: $2.08 million; 2025: $2.89 million | May 2026 | bloomlabs |
| Sellers saying lack of buyer demand limited sales in the past 12 months | 95% | Jun 2026 | Pollination Foundation |
| Total voluntary biodiversity credit transactions (another estimate) | under $2 million | Jan 2026 | Climate Policy Initiative |
| Voluntary biodiversity credit market (per year) | around $8 million | Dec 2023 | World Economic Forum |
| Blue carbon share of voluntary carbon market issuance | less than 1% | Nov 2025 | Calyx Global |
| Mangrove share of claimed blue carbon removals | about 99% | Nov 2025 | Calyx Global |
How large is the market for nature credits?
According to bloomlabs, which tracks the market, recorded sales of voluntary biodiversity credits total $6.93 million since the first recorded sale: $2.08 million in 2024 and $2.89 million in 2025. It estimates that sales including unannounced over-the-counter deals are around $8-10 million. In a survey of 52 market actors (Pollination Foundation and bloomlabs, June 2026), 95% of sellers said lack of buyer demand limited sales in the past 12 months.
Blue carbon projects account for less than 1% of credits issued to date in the voluntary carbon market, and mangroves account for about 99% of claimed removals (Calyx Global). A 2022 study noted that almost all crediting schemes had been implemented for mangroves and salt marshes, and reported the start of Japan's scheme for seagrass and seaweed beds (Kuwae et al., 2022). Verra states that it currently has no methodologies supporting seaweed farming, kelp restoration or seabed management (Verra).
| Fiscal year | Projects certified | Volume (t-CO2, our sum) |
|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 1 | 22.8 |
| 2021 | 4 | 80.4 |
| 2022 | 21 | 3,733.1 |
| 2023 | 29 | 2,170.3 |
| 2024 | 46 | 3,178.3 |
| 2025 | 52 | 3,089.9 |
How much do credits in Japan trade, and at what price?
Cumulative J-Credit certification stands at 14.05 million t-CO2 across 1,430 registered projects (including transferred projects, as of the 68th certification committee; J-Credit Scheme secretariat, May 2026). On the Tokyo Stock Exchange carbon credit market, forest credits made up 24,571 t of the 1,132,810 t traded through 30 September 2026. Weighted average prices per tonne were ¥2,983 for energy saving, ¥4,666 for renewable electricity, ¥5,396 for forest and ¥4,442 for extended mid-season drainage of rice paddies (Japan Exchange Group).
Under the J-Blue Credit scheme, 52 projects were certified in fiscal 2025, totalling 3,089.9 t (our sum). JBE gives a reference average price for public-offering sales of ¥69,000 per tonne excluding tax (Japan Blue Economy Association, as of 29 June 2026). The study by Kuwae et al., 2026 also finds the average unit value, about $400 per tonne, high compared with other credits.
| Item | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Projects certified in fiscal 2025 | 52 | Japan Blue Economy Association |
| Volume in fiscal 2025 (sum of projects) | 3,089.9 t-CO2 (our sum) | Japan Blue Economy Association |
| Average volume per project | 59.4 t-CO2 (our calculation) | Our calculation |
| Reference average price for public-offering sales | ¥69,000 per t-CO2 excl. tax (as of 29 June 2026) | Japan Blue Economy Association |
| Upper bound of income per project | about ¥4.1 million (our calculation, if all credits sell at the average price) | Our calculation |
Can credit income cover the costs?
A study of the Port of Hakata blue carbon credits (Sugimura et al., 2023) estimated a break-even price of ¥197,897 per t-CO2 (¥129,814 excluding administrative costs). Set-up costs were ¥14.634 million and the credit volume was 48.5 t-CO2. The sales price at the time was ¥8,800 (incl. tax, fixed), so the break-even price was about 22 times the sales price, or about 15 times excluding administrative costs (ratios are our calculation).
Across the J-Blue Credit scheme, the average volume per project in fiscal 2025 was 59.4 t. Even if all credits sold at the ¥69,000 reference average, the upper bound of income per project is about ¥4.1 million (our calculation, before fees and costs). The study of 61 J-Blue projects (Kuwae et al., 2026) states in its discussion that "the income from credits is often insufficient to cover the costs of implementation and certification." It also finds that emphasizing economic benefits lowered unit prices, while emphasizing multi-stakeholder collaboration raised both the number of purchasers and unit prices.
| Case or source | Who pays and who receives (as stated in the source) | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Forest J-Credits (Japan) | Most verification costs covered by government cost support (e.g. ¥1.15m, ¥1.35m and ¥2.2m fully supported). One case of ¥930,000 in outsourcing costs. Intermediary fees cited as "0-50% of credit sales". Sales prices ¥8,000-10,000 per tonne excl. tax. No case reports income or balance | Forestry Agency of Japan |
| J-Blue Credits (Japan) | When sold by public offering, part of the proceeds is deducted as a "de facto public-offering fee" at settlement (rate not stated in the fee schedule). Issuance fee without public offering: ¥100,000 excl. tax | Japan Blue Economy Association |
| Port of Hakata blue carbon credits (Japan) | Surveys and conservation are contracted out by Fukuoka City and funded from the city budget. The study states that continued conservation is possible because the city covers what credit income cannot | Sugimura et al., 2023 |
| Carbon credit intermediaries (global) | About 10% of intermediaries disclose their fees; the average disclosed fee is 15.5% (noted as a possible underestimate) | Carbon Market Watch |
| 47 voluntary carbon market projects (global) | Revenues are in many cases shared mainly with project implementers; many arrangements could not be verified (sample noted as not representative) | Öko-Institut |
| Sindh mangroves, Pakistan (news) | According to news reports, the provincial government received 40% ($14.747 million) of credit sales and the developer 60% ($25.253 million). No community share is given in the article | The Express Tribune |
| Liberia forests (news) | According to news reports, a leaked MoU gave a Dubai company control over 10% of the country for 30 years, with 70% of credit sales to the company and 30% to Liberia | Daily Maverick |
Who pays, and who receives?
For forest J-Credits in Japan, the Forestry Agency's case studies list verification costs largely covered by government cost support, outsourcing costs of ¥930,000 in one case, and intermediary fees of 0-50% of credit sales (Forestry Agency of Japan). One case reached the cost-support budget ceiling and tried to pay for verification itself, but was turned down by the verifier because the deadline was near. For J-Blue Credits, part of the proceeds of public-offering sales is deducted as a fee (Japan Blue Economy Association).
In global carbon markets, about 10% of intermediaries disclose their fees, with an average disclosed fee of 15.5% (Carbon Market Watch, 2023). The organization notes that it is impossible to know how much goes to climate action and how much to intermediaries. According to news reports, the Sindh provincial government in Pakistan received 40% of mangrove credit sales and the developer 60% (The Express Tribune, November 2024).
| Source | What it states | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Voluntary REDD+ in six countries | Analysing 26 sites, "most projects have not significantly reduced deforestation". Of 90.5 million offsets potentially generated by 18 projects through 2020, only 6.4 million (7%) are associated with additional reductions. Figures from the version corrected on 31 January 2024 | West et al., 2023 |
| Kariba REDD+ (Zimbabwe, VCS 902) | Of 26,822,953 credits issued, 15,220,520 were excess (about 57%, our calculation). Verra cancelled 5,049,473 buffer credits, requested equal compensation from the developer and permanently removed 10,083,263 unissued credits | Verra |
| IPBES Transformative Change Assessment (A6) | Many biodiversity offsets may seem to address biodiversity loss but have faced challenges with compliance and with managing the complexity of measurement and offsetting (established but incomplete) | IPBES |
Did issued credits deliver what they claimed?
A study comparing forest conservation credit projects in six countries with matched control sites (West et al., 2023) found that most projects have not significantly reduced deforestation. Of 90.5 million offsets potentially generated by 18 projects through 2020, 6.4 million (7%) are associated with additional emission reductions. For Kariba REDD+ in Zimbabwe, Verra found in September 2025 that 15,220,520 credits, about 57% of those issued, were excess (Verra).
| Issue | What it states | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Position on stacking | Conditional support: additionality shown independently for each credit type, no double claims across buyers, separate sale and retirement. Buyers of carbon credits must not simultaneously claim the biodiversity outcomes of the same area | Plan Vivo Foundation |
| What buyers should check | Whether registries and retirement systems prevent double counting and double claiming; for bundled credits, whether biodiversity is measured or only described, and independently verified and retired or only priced in | Biodiversity Credit Alliance |
| Seaweed beds in Japan's national reporting | In April 2024 Japan reported removals by seagrass and seaweed beds of about 350,000 t-CO2 per year (for 2022) to the UNFCCC secretariat | Ports and Harbours Bureau, MLIT |
| J-Blue Credit guidelines | No statement on the relationship with the national greenhouse gas inventory. The double-counting check covers duplicate applications, issuance and sales | Japan Blue Economy Association |
What is double counting between carbon and biodiversity?
Issuing both carbon and biodiversity credits from the same area or activity is called stacking. Plan Vivo Foundation (June 2026) supports it under conditions, and the Biodiversity Credit Alliance (July 2026) states that buyers of carbon credits alone should not claim the biodiversity outcomes.
In Japan, removals by seagrass and seaweed beds (about 350,000 t-CO2 per year for 2022) were reported to the UN in April 2024 (Ports and Harbours Bureau, MLIT). The J-Blue Credit application guidelines (Ver.2.4, March 2024) contain no statement on the relationship with the national greenhouse gas inventory (Japan Blue Economy Association). This page does not judge whether double counting occurs.
An example of creating buyers by regulation: England
England requires developers to deliver a 10% biodiversity net gain, and the government sells statutory credits to developers who cannot meet it in other ways. The report describes statutory credits as "a last resort backstop for developers", says "the overall level of receipts remained relatively low" at £426,100 in 2025-26, and states that the policy "continued to operate as expected" (Defra, UK Government). The income funded the creation of 44.6 habitat units in Lincolnshire (£530,000).
| Framework | What it states | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Kunming-Montreal GBF, Target 19(d) | Stimulating innovative schemes such as payment for ecosystem services, green bonds, biodiversity offsets and credits, and benefit-sharing mechanisms, with environmental and social safeguards | Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity |
| Same, Target 19(f) | Promoting non-market-based approaches and Mother Earth centric actions, the latter defined to include the non-commodification of environmental functions | Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity |
| IPBES Transformative Change Assessment (A7) | The dominant economic system, with its focus on market-led development, investment and export-led growth, reduces nature to a single economic value and marginalizes other ways of valuing nature (well established) | IPBES |
| IPBES Business and Biodiversity Assessment (Table SPM.1) | The list of actions (B.2.3, C.2.2) includes high-integrity biodiversity credits | IPBES |
How do international frameworks treat credits?
Target 19 of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework lists, within the same target, innovative schemes including biodiversity offsets and credits (d) and non-market-based approaches (f) (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity). The IPBES Transformative Change Assessment states that the dominant economic system reduces nature to a single economic value (IPBES, A7). The IPBES Business and Biodiversity Assessment includes high-integrity biodiversity credits in its list of actions (IPBES).
Frequently asked questions
Q1. How large is the biodiversity credit market?
According to bloomlabs, which tracks the market, recorded sales of voluntary biodiversity credits total $6.93 million since the first recorded sale (article of 3 August 2026). It estimates that total sales including unannounced over-the-counter deals are around $8-10 million. The Climate Policy Initiative (January 2026) estimated total transactions at under $2 million; figures differ by source.
Q2. How much do Japan's J-Blue Credits cost, and how many are issued?
The Japan Blue Economy Association (JBE) gives a reference average price for public-offering sales of 69,000 yen per tonne of CO2, excluding tax (as of 29 June 2026). In fiscal 2025, 52 projects were certified, totalling 3,089.9 t by our sum of project-level volumes. A study of 61 projects and 471 transactions (Kuwae et al., 2026) reports an average unit value of about $400 per tonne.
Q3. Can credit income cover the cost of protecting seaweed beds or forests?
In its discussion, the study of J-Blue Credits (Kuwae et al., 2026) states that "the income from credits is often insufficient to cover the costs of implementation and certification." A study of the Port of Hakata credits (Sugimura et al., 2023) estimated a break-even price of 197,897 yen per tonne against a fixed sales price of 8,800 yen. This page does not evaluate individual projects.
Q4. Can carbon and biodiversity credits be issued from the same site?
Plan Vivo (June 2026) supports this under conditions: additionality shown separately for each credit type, separate sale and retirement, and no double claims across buyers. The Biodiversity Credit Alliance (July 2026) states that buyers of carbon credits alone should not claim the biodiversity outcomes.
Source ledger (primary sources and peer-reviewed studies)
| Source | Publisher | Date | URL | Accessed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How to sell a biodiversity credit? (cumulative recorded sales) | bloomlabs | 2026-08-03 | https://newsletter.bloomlabs.earth/p/how-to-sell-a-biodiversity-credit | 2026-10-12 |
| Monthly Market Overview - April 2026 (annual sales, estimate including over-the-counter sales) | bloomlabs | 2026-05-07 | https://newsletter.bloomlabs.earth/p/monthly-market-overview-april-2026 | 2026-10-12 |
| Voluntary Biodiversity Credit Markets Report 2026 (survey of 52 market actors) | Pollination Foundation and bloomlabs | 2026-06-12 | https://pollinationfoundation.org/global-perspectives/nature-markets-2026 | 2026-10-12 |
| Publisher announcement of the report (95% of sellers) | Pollination Foundation | 2026-06 | https://www.linkedin.com/posts/pollination-foundation_voluntary-biodiversity-credit-markets-report-activity-7470954268250787840-gHI6 | 2026-10-12 |
| From growing interest to action: what is shaping corporate uptake of biodiversity credits | Climate Policy Initiative | 2026-01-27 | https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/from-growing-interest-to-action-what-is-shaping-corporate-uptake-of-biodiversity-credits | 2026-10-12 |
| Biodiversity Credits: Demand Analysis and Market Outlook | World Economic Forum | 2023-12 | https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_2023_Biodiversity_Credits_Demand_Analysis_and_Market_Outlook.pdf | 2026-10-12 |
| Blue Carbon: What the rising tide of coastal conservation means for the voluntary carbon market | Calyx Global | 2025-11-04 | https://calyxglobal.com/research-hub/research/blue-carbon-what-the-rising-tide-of-coastal-conservation-means-for-the-voluntary-carbon-market/ | 2026-10-12 |
| Kuwae et al. Implementation of blue carbon offset crediting for seagrass meadows, macroalgal beds, and macroalgae farming in Japan. Marine Policy 138:104996 | Elsevier (peer-reviewed) | 2022 | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2022.104996 | 2026-10-12 |
| Blue Carbon (methodology coverage) | Verra | 2026-10-12 (accessed) | https://verra.org/programs/verified-carbon-standard/area-of-focus-blue-carbon | 2026-10-12 |
| J-Credit Scheme data book, May 2026 (in Japanese) | J-Credit Scheme secretariat | 2026-05 | https://japancredit.go.jp/data/pdf/credit_002.pdf | 2026-10-12 |
| Carbon credit market traded volume and prices, 11 Oct 2023 to 30 Sep 2026 (in Japanese) | Japan Exchange Group | 2026-09-30 | https://www.jpx.co.jp/equities/carbon-credit/daily/nlsgeu000006ltge-att/TradedPriceandVolume.pdf | 2026-10-12 |
| J-Blue Credit certification and issuance list by fiscal year (in Japanese) | Japan Blue Economy Association (JBE) | 2026-10-12 (accessed) | https://www.blueeconomy.jp/credit/vandi/ | 2026-10-12 |
| Fee schedule as of 29 June 2026 (in Japanese) | Japan Blue Economy Association (JBE) | 2026-06-29 | https://www.blueeconomy.jp/wp-content/uploads/jbc2026/20260629JBC-commission.pdf | 2026-10-12 |
| Kuwae, Suzuki and Furuya. Empirical analysis of project–purchaser dynamics in Japan's blue carbon dioxide removal credit scheme. npj Ocean Sustainability 5:42 | Springer Nature (peer-reviewed) | 2026-06-02 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s44183-026-00213-1 | 2026-10-12 |
| Sugimura, Ano, Mito and Okada. Sustainability of seaweed bed conservation using blue carbon credits: break-even prices of municipal credits. Journal of Coastal Zone Studies 36(1):23-31 (in Japanese) | Japan Society of Coastal Zone Studies (peer-reviewed) | 2023 | https://doi.org/10.57296/jaczs.36.1_23 | 2026-10-12 |
| Case studies of forest J-Credit projects, FY2023 (in Japanese) | Forestry Agency of Japan | 2024-02 | https://www.rinya.maff.go.jp/j/sin_riyou/ondanka/attach/pdf/240226-20.pdf | 2026-10-12 |
| Carbon Market Watch briefing on intermediaries (AlliedOffsets data) | Carbon Market Watch | 2023-02 | https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/CMW-briefing-on-intermediaries.pdf | 2026-10-12 |
| Assessing transparency and integrity of benefit sharing arrangements related to voluntary carbon market projects | Öko-Institut | 2023-11 | https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Assessing-transparency-and-integrity-of-benefit-sharing-arrangements-related-to-voluntary-carbon-market-projects.pdf | 2026-10-12 |
| West et al. Action needed to make carbon offsets from forest conservation work for climate change mitigation. Science 381:873-877 (corrected 31 January 2024) | AAAS (peer-reviewed) | 2023-08-25 | https://doi.org/10.1126/science.ade3535 | 2026-10-12 |
| Verra Acts on Kariba Project: Cancels Excess Credits, Advances Independent Review | Verra | 2025-09-23 | https://verra.org/verra-acts-on-kariba-project-cancels-excess-credits-advances-independent-review/ | 2026-10-12 |
| Linking Biodiversity Credits and Carbon Credits: Clarifying Bundling, Stacking, Stapling, and Related Models | Biodiversity Credit Alliance | 2026-07 | https://www.biodiversitycreditalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/BCA_Knowledge-Brief_carbonBD_.pdf | 2026-10-12 |
| Position statement on stacking biodiversity and carbon credits | Plan Vivo Foundation | 2026-06-05 | https://www.planvivo.org/news-insights/position-statement-on-stacking-biodiversity-and-carbon-credits | 2026-10-12 |
| Blue infrastructure initiatives, document 3 (in Japanese) | Ports and Harbours Bureau, MLIT | 2025 | https://www.mlit.go.jp/policy/shingikai/content/001864549.pdf | 2026-10-12 |
| J-Blue Credit application guidelines Ver.2.4 (in Japanese) | Japan Blue Economy Association (JBE) | 2024-03 | https://www.blueeconomy.jp/wp-content/uploads/jbc2024/20240312_J-BlueCredit_Guidline_v.2.4.pdf | 2026-10-12 |
| Biodiversity net gain (BNG) statutory credits report: 1 April 2025 to 31 March 2026 | Defra, UK Government | 2026-06-15 | https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/biodiversity-net-gain-bng-statutory-credit-reports-2025-to-2026/biodiversity-net-gain-bng-statutory-credits-report-1-april-2025-to-31-march-2026 | 2026-10-12 |
| Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, Target 19 | Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity | 2022-12 | https://www.cbd.int/gbf/targets/19 | 2026-10-12 |
| IPBES Transformative Change Assessment, Summary for Policymakers (final) | IPBES | 2025-09-11 (Zenodo) | https://zenodo.org/records/17099400 | 2026-10-12 |
| IPBES Business and Biodiversity Assessment, Summary for Policymakers (final) | IPBES | 2026-06-16 (Zenodo) | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20714890 | 2026-10-12 |
Source ledger (news reports)
| Source | Publisher | Date | URL | Accessed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Monetising Sindh's forest cover by earning carbon credits | The Express Tribune (news) | 2024-11-25 | https://tribune.com.pk/story/2511686/monetising-sindhs-forest-cover-by-earning-carbon-credits | 2026-10-12 |
| Dubai carbon trader buys up African forests | Daily Maverick (news) | 2023-11-28 | https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-11-28-dubai-carbon-trader-buys-up-african-forests/ | 2026-10-12 |
What this page does not cover
It does not evaluate the balance of individual projects or places, does not cover green infrastructure or renewable energy (see IPBES Nexus Assessment: Renewable Energy and Nature), and does not use market forecasts by research firms. Figures that could not be checked against primary sources are not included.
About this page
Compiled by Hiroaki Kojima, Vice Director, Karatsu Farm & Food / Contact: kojima@karatsu-f-f.com (contact page) / Published: October 13, 2026 / Markdown: en/nature-credits.mdRelated links
▶ Karatsu Data Bank
▶ IPBES Business and Biodiversity Assessment: Key Messages and Finance Flows
▶ IPBES Nexus Assessment: Summary and All 71 Response Options
▶ 自然のクレジットの収入と費用（日本語）